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The Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) is at a crossroad for 
organizational change.  New and emerging war fighting doctrine, which places an 
emphasis on joint and small contingency operations, as well as new technology, requires 
that the MACCS review how it is organizationally structured.  Within the next few years, 
the Marine Corps will field the Common Aviation Command and Control System 
(CAC2S).  CAC2S is designed to be a singular tactical system for all functional agencies 
within the Marine Air Control Group (MACG).  Unique systems, which were in the past 
tailored for the specific missions, will be eliminated with the fielding of CAC2S.  CAC2S 
will allow the MACCS to operate in a manner that could not be achieved when the 
MACCS was first formed during the 1960’s.  Many sources in the Fleet Marine Force 
and the support establishment recognize that the MACCS must reorganize in order to 
operate and function effectively within the confines of this emerging 21st century 
technology and doctrine.  Parallels exist between how industry and business reorganize 
when introduced to new technologies and business doctrine, and the military.  
Organizational restructuring is something that must be carefully considered and planned, 
for it is most often resisted by the members and stakeholders of an organization.  
Overcoming the barriers and resistance to change requires formal models of change be 
implemented.  Technology alone cannot increase or improve an organization’s 
productivity.  Only through formal restructuring can an organization such as the MACCS 
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The Marine Corps is a unique warfighting entity in that it is capable of self-
contained/self sustained military operations.  The Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) can provide all the required elements necessary to carry out wartime, NEO, 
peacekeeping, or other military operations.  Integral to the “Air” (or Aviation) portion of 
the MAGTF is the Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW).  Each of the four MAW’s (three 
active, and one reserve) consists of groups and squadrons of fixed wing, rotary wing, 
transport aircraft, and a command and control (C2) element.  Figure 1 is a graphical 









Figure 1. The Marine Aircraft Wing. 
 
It is this C2 element, provided by the Marine Air Control Group (MACG), and its 
subordinate squadrons, that will be central to this thesis.  Command and control are 
considered vital to any military operation, and computer enhanced/controlled C2 has been 
a part of Marine aviation since the Vietnam era.  The MACG is tasked with fielding the 
Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS).  The MACCS is both a functional 
and technical system, and has been structured since its inception to be task organized, 
with the basic theme being “centralized command, decentralized control”.  This means 
that each subordinate squadron of the MACG is formed to provide a tactical piece of the 
MACCS.  No one single squadron, or tactical component, can work autonomously to 
complete C2 operations.  Only when working together can the squadrons of the MACCS 
field all necessary elements to carry out air command and control operations.   
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Command and Control (C2) operations, in any arena, can be depicted by Admiral 
Cebrowski’s triangle of Doctrine, Technology, and Organization, as shown in Figure 2.  




Figure 2. C2 Triangle. [From: Jansen, 2000] 
 
This triangle is a socio-technical system that shows how the three entities, 
working within the environment of warfare, combine to give the C2 its effectiveness.  
Since the end of the Vietnam War, when the need for C2 in aviation operations for the 
MAGTF was identified, much about warfare has changed.  While the doctrine of the 
Marine Corps is still based primarily upon amphibious operations, the way that 
operations are carried out (as well as the antagonists) has changed dramatically.  General 
C.C. Krulak's ‘Three Block War’ scenario, Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
(OMFTS), Joint Vision (JV) 2020, humanitarian operations, and the fall of the Soviet 
Union, as well as the subsequent rise of rogue terrorist nations, have forced the Marine 
Corps to view how to fight in a different light.  The two major theater war scenario is a 
fading reality, recently acknowledged by Secretary of Defense Robert Rumsfeld. 
At the same time, technology has dramatically changed how operational forces 
can carry out military operations.  Information Warfare and Network Centric Warfare are 
seen as force multipliers in today's Department of Defense (DoD).  The speed and flow of 
information from top to bottom has been revolutionized with satellite and digital 
communications.  In Kosovo, for the first time in the history of modern warfare, 
“victory” was claimed by U.S. forces without ever putting troops on the ground in 
combat.  The ability to fight smaller, faster, lighter and from greater striking distance is 
feasible due to technological advances.  The cumbersome hierarchal organization that 
was needed to receive, process, and decipher information is no longer required in the 
current form. 
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The MACCS fights within these confines.  However, since the 1960's, its 
structure has remained unchanged in organizational structure.  There is still a “stovepipe” 
feel to the organizations, where Squadrons in the MACG are organized along task lines.  
For instance, the Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) is dedicated to the control of 
aircraft in an air-to-air tactical situation, where the Marine Air Support Squadron 
(MASS) is dedicated to operations involving aircraft used air support functions.  The 
MACCS remains very hierarchical, with detachments reporting to the squadrons (known 
as centers in a tactical situation) up to the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), fielded 
by the Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron (MTACS). 
The MACCS is at a crossroad for organizational change, with the imminent 
fielding of the Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), and 
formation of new doctrines for the 21st century.  CAC2S was conceptualized in the early 
1990’s as the single system solution for elements of the MACCS.  No longer will each 
squadron use specifically designed systems, which in the past were tailored for specific 
missions.  As all information required in C2 operations for the MAW is processed by a 
single system, as joint operations are at a premium, it is time to restructure the MACCS 
to meet the mission requirements of the 21st Century. The organization must change 
along with the doctrine and technology in the C2 triangle. 
Focus must shift from technological solutions to organizational solutions.  In a 
meeting held on March 17th, 2001, at the Stanford Business School, 18 Marine Corps 
Generals participated in a meeting with Silicon Valley IT executives.  In that meeting, the 
executives noted that IT was not about hardware or software.  Instead, IT was an 
organizational ethos, emphasizing speed in converting data to information to decisions 
(Jones, 1999).  No organization can continue to operate in the same manner as the other 
two entities, technology and doctrine, change.  New C2 computer systems continued to 
be developed, and then forced into the same organizational structures.  It is expected, 
then, that organizations would seek marked improvements in productivity.  However, an 
organization cannot change and improve with technology alone.  Organizations need 
restructuring in processes and ways of doing business.  This is the obstacle that stands in 
front of truly changing for the future – the organizational change. 
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The restructuring of any organization, be it military, commercial, or educational is 
an extremely arduous task.  People naturally resist any change to the way they function.  
More times than not, when change is needed, it is technology or doctrine that is changed; 
yet the organization remains stagnant and unmoved.  However, no organization can adapt 
to the ever-changing environment without looking at how it functions and identify where 
shortcomings exist.  And no organization can change itself from the inside; the change 
must come from external sources.  Whether that be having the members step away from 
the organization and looking back into it, or having an outside entity change it, it must 
occur from the outside.  Barriers to change must be broken down in such a way as to 
offer as little resistance from the members as possible. 
This thesis is intended to look at the Marine Air Command and Control System 
(MACCS) and take a view from the outside to offer change to the members populating it.  
This view of reorganization will be based upon research, interviews with members of the 
MACCS support community, professional publications, and individual experiences with 
the MACCS.  The basis of experience comes from internally being involved with both 
the Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) and the Marine Tactical Air Command 
Squadron (MTACS); as well as lengthy experience as a project officer at the Marine 
Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, serving as the TACC project officer and with 
close ties to the MACG and MTACS. Collectively, those experiences, as well as studies 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, form a core that brings a unique perspective to 
organizational change, conviction that for some time the MACCS needed, if it were to 
survive in any form, a restructuring effort. 
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In the fall of 1996, at a briefing of the Operational Advisory Group (OAG), 
composed of officers within the fleet and support community of the Marine Air Control 
Group, changes were proposed to equipment that was going to be procured to replace 
obsolete computer systems within the MTACS.  This was the largest gathering of MACG 
officers that had collectively come together in one place, at one time, for the sole purpose 
of interjection into the requirements and system procurement process.  For one of the first 
times, operational forces were given the chance, along with acquisition, doctrine and 
training personnel, to express desires needed in new equipment.  All four MTACS 
squadrons within the MACG had an equal voice.  There were several dissenting opinions 
to the final outcome, but the consensus in a viable, off the shelf, open architecture 
solution was decided upon.  In late 1996, a meeting was held by the Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command (MCCDC) to discuss several options for reorganization.  
At this meeting, consensus was not nearly as easy to come to.  It was agreed that there 
was a need for better, newer, smaller equipment based on open standards but few could 
envision massively changing the organizational structure.  Thirteen different proposals 
were presented by an independent contractor to a collection of officers from the original 
OAG meeting.  The conclusion was that there was a need for some sort of restructuring, 
but no single best solution could be determined.  There was a threat to certain 
stakeholders in each proposal.  Many refused to consider a radical restructuring of the 
MACCS, since the structure had ‘worked’ for so long.  Absent from most of these 
meetings, it is noteworthy, were members from the fixed and rotary wing communities.  
After this meeting, several other OAGs were held.  Most expanded on previous meetings. 
However, more and more, tasks and action items assigned from previous meetings were 
not being accomplished.  Few seemed interested in wide spread change.  It was too 
foreign a concept. 
This thesis will lay out the organization of the MACCS, doctrines and 
technologies.  Further, a foundation of factors that are driving change will be laid out.  
Finally, the method to organizational change will be discussed in the final chapter.  A 
single, “best” solution on how to restructure will not be proposed in this thesis.  Rather, 
insight will be offered into how obstacles and resistance to change can be circumvented, 
as well as why barriers exist, with the goal toward a longer-term view on becoming a 
more effective and relevant piece of the MAGTF in the 21st century.  Consequences to 
NOT reorganizing, using abstracts from business and applying them to the military, will 
be discussed as well.  Further research should be conducted, with specific models of 
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II. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE MARINE AIR COMMAND 
AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
Several Marine Corps doctrinal publications exist that deal with Marine aviation 
and the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) specifically.  These 
documents lay out structure and organization, as well as detail equipment.  Marine 
Aviation is detailed in the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MWCP) 3-2.  The 
introduction by General J.E. Rhodes, published in December 2000, follows: 
Aviation is an integral part of the naval expeditionary air-ground team—it 
ex-tends the MAGTF’s operational reach and flexibility and expands its 
warfighting power.  Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-2, 
AviationOperations, applies the warfighting philosophy in Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, to Marine aviation 
operations.  It is the link between higher order doctrines and the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures contained in other Marine aviation doctrinal 
publications.  This publication establishes the doctrinal basis for the 
planning and execution of aviation operations and provides the philosophy 
for employment of Marine aviation in the prosecution of war and other 
operations in support of the Marine Corps’ mission as the nation’s 
expeditionary force in readiness.  This publication is intended primarily 
for commanders and staff officers who are responsible for the planning 
and execution of aviation operations.  Nonetheless, it should be read by all 
Marines who are supported by or involved in the execution of aviation 
operations.  It is also intended for other doctrine centers, joint and 
multinational staffs, professional military educational activities, and any 
other activity that requires an understanding of Marine aviation.  It 
explains U.S. Marine Corps aviation capabilities and how the Marine air-
ground task force (MAGTF) exploits these capabilities, both operationally 
and tactically.  It does not discuss the specifics of unit-level tactics and 
procedures; e.g., air-to-air com-bat tactics, how to conduct a 
helicopterborne operation, or how to attack any particular target.  Rather, 
this publication applies maneuver warfare concepts to Marine aviation 
operations, especially in aviation’s role as an integrated combat arm of the 
MAGTF. 
The MACCS is more specifically detailed in both the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication (MCWP) 3-25, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, and MCWP 3-25-3, The 
Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook.  MCWP 3-25, published in 
February 1998, superceded the Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-60, Control of 
Aircraft and Missiles.  Designed for Marine air-ground task force, naval expeditionary 
7 
force, and joint force commanders, their staffs, and any other Marine Corps personnel 
involved in the planning and execution of aviation command and control operations, the 
MCWP 3-25 discusses how the control of aircraft and missiles is the function which 
integrates the six functions of Marine aviation into a cohesive effort.  It further presents 
principles of aviation control; the Marine Corps' philosophy of centralized command and 
decentralized control, the integration of Marine control of aircraft and missiles in Marine 
air-ground task forces, naval expeditionary forces, and joint force operations, the 
responsibilities of the Marine Corps forces component commander when designated as 
the airspace control authority, and how all this is effected in the Marine air command and 
control system.  
The MCWP 3-25-3, The Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook, 
was published in December 1997 as a follow on to MCWP 3-25.  The Marine air 
command and control system (MACCS) provides the Marine aviation combat element 
commander with the means to exercise command and control of organic and nonorganic 
aviation assets necessary to support Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations.  
The Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, 
addresses basic planning considerations for MACCS operations, employment, and 
interoperability among MACCS and joint Service agencies.  The Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-25.3, Marine Air Command and Control System 
Handbook, complements and expands on the information in FMFM 5-60 by focusing on 
the employment of the MACCS as a whole.  This publication emphasizes system 
interoperability, air command and control agency interface, and overarching planning 
considerations.  Designated for MAGTF commanders, naval expeditionary force 
commanders, joint force commanders, and their staffs, the MCWP 3-25.3 examines 
MACCS functions, composition, organization, planning considerations, and employment 
options.  By investigating these areas, the MCWP 3-25.3 provides the requisite 
information needed by commanders and their staffs to understand and evaluate the 
operational principles and capabilities of various MACCS employment options.  
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These documents lay out the foundation of command and control.  It is a vital, 
necessary tool for the controlling of amphibious forces, and not tied to Marine aviation 
alone.  Successful deployment of any Marine operational unit falls solely on how well 
those forces can be coordinated to achieve a single purpose.  Although command and 
control are vital to all MAGTF missions and units, due to the inherent technical level of 
aviation assets, it is probably more vital to the Aviation Command Element (ACE) than 
any other element in the MAGTF.  As noted in the MCWP 3-25,  
The management of the air portion of the Marine air-ground task force's 
battlespace is the first element Marine aviation performs to establish a 
foundation for the control of aircraft and missiles.  The Marine air 
command and control system performs both the battlespace management 
and control requirements necessary for effective employment of MAGTF 
aviation 
Marine Corps aviation is developed around six principles, or functions.  These 
functions are the core elements to successful deployment of the ACE in support of the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  The six functions of Marine aviation are: 
Assault Support; Offensive Air Support; AntiAir Warfare; Air Reconnaissance; 
Electronic Warfare; and Control of Aircraft and Missiles (Figure 3 is a graphical 
representation).  It is the function of Control of Aircraft and Missiles that will be central 
to this document.  
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Figure 3. Six Functions of Marine Aviation. 
 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
As previously noted, the control of aircraft and missiles is primarily performed by 
the Marine Air Command and System (MACCS).  The control of Marine aviation forces 
can be accomplished by other services, and might very well be in joint situations, but for 
the sake of this thesis, the MACCS will be considered the primary source.  The MACCS 
is not a technical system; rather, it is an organizational system’, or a tactical system 
comprised of units deploying communication and computer systems in support of Marine 
aviation.   
1. Current MACG/MACCS 
The MACCS is a tactical system.  When functioning properly, units of the Marine 
Air Control Group (MACG) are working together for the common purpose of 
accomplishing the function of control of aircraft and missiles of the MAGTF ACE.  
Control of aircraft and missiles encompasses the coordinated employment of facilities, 
equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel in order to enable the ACE 
commander to plan, direct, and control the efforts of the ACE to support the MAGTF. 
Although it can be task organized, for the most part, the MACCS is the C2 arm of 
the ACE of the MAGTF, and is a MEF level asset.  By this, it is meant that currently, the 
MACCS must function as a complete and whole system, with all tactical units that belong 
to the MACG working together, to be effective.  Only when all subordinate units in the 
MACG are present can the six functions of Marine aviation be supported.  Figure 4 




















 Figure 4. Marine Air Control Group Organizational Structure. [From: The 
Marine Air Command and Control System and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 
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Part Three: Organization] 
 
The MACG currently consists of six squadrons or battalions.  The six are: 
• Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron (MTACS) – responsible for 
fielding the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), which functions as 
the headquarters for the entire MACCS.  The role of the TACC is to 
function as the senior MAGTF air command and control agency and to 
serve as the operational command post of the ACE commander or his 
designated representative; the Senior Watch Officer (SWO).  The SWO 
can direct, supervise, control, and coordinate all MAGTF tactical air 
operations.  The TACC’s main function is to process and disseminate the 
Air Tasking Order (ATO) to upper and lower echelon aviation units, as 
well as managing the ATO mission process.  The ATO is the document 
that is published and disseminated to all units, that depicts all air targets 
(on call and pre planned), as well as air assets available to support the 
MAGTF mission each day.  This would include helicopter, fixed wing, 
and transport aircraft.   
• Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) – responsible for the fielding of 
the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC).  The TAOC’s main function 
is the tactical direction of combat aircraft, primarily in the air-to-air 
combat role, as well as to provide surveillance, weapons control, and 
traffic management of the ACE's aviation assets.  Additionally, the MACS 
is the parent squadron to Air Traffic Control (ATC) detachments.  ATC is 
responsible for procedural control of all aircraft within the MACCS 
allotted airspace.  The MACS supports the Air Defense, as well as control 
of aircraft and missiles, for the ACE. 
• Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) – responsible for fielding the 
Direct Air Support Center (DASC).  The DASC is the principle air control 
agency responsible for the conduct of tactical air and assault support 
operations directly supporting the ground forces.  The DASC is 
additionally responsible for executing the ATO by adjusting preplanned 
schedules or diverting airborne assets at the request of the GCE.  Further, 
the DASC is the agency responsible to locate and assign assets for 
immediate air support requests.  The MASS supports OAS and Assault 
Support functions. 
• Marine Wing Communications Squadron (MWCS) – The MWCS is 
the primary communication organization within the Marine Aircraft Wing 
(MAW), and is a subordinate squadron within the Marine Air Control 
Group (MACG).  The Marine Wing Communications Squadron is tasked 
to install, operate, and maintain expeditionary communications for the 
ACE of a MEF.  The MWCS is currently not responsible for the fielding 
of sensors or radar systems organic to the MACCS. 
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• Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion – responsible for the fielding of 
shoulder fired Stinger missiles and the vehicle mounted (Avenger) missile 
system.  Provides a low altitude air defense system for the Marine area of 
responsibility.   
• VMU – responsible for fielding and operation of remotely piloted vehicles 
to be used in reconnaissance roles.   
2. Historical Overview of MACCS Structure 
The MACCS was developed during the Vietnam War era in response to the 
growing need for a better command and control function to support Marine aviation 
efforts.  The original structure was designed in its current form due to the type of control 
required during the Vietnam years.  Highly structured command and control was required 
because of technically advanced avionics in Marine aircraft, the need for such aircraft to 
perform specific missions, and the fact that technology at the time dictated a highly 
vertical system of checks and balances. 
As an example, Marine ground forces required air support for mission 
accomplishment.  Close air support is a true force multiplier for Marine ground forces, 
allowing for indirect fire support out of range of ground artillery.  Due to the fact that 
attack aircraft at that time, namely the A-4, were not as technologically advanced as 
today’s aircraft, precise control to put bombs on target was a requirement.  The Direct Air 
Support Center (DASC) was created, staffed, and equipped to provide that mission of 
directing attack aircraft from their holding, or ‘stack’ point, to a target with precision. 
Likewise, air-to-air combat was an integral part of the Vietnam air campaign.  
Fighter aircraft (F-4 Phantoms) did not contain the onboard avionics that are prevalent in 
today’s more sophisticated fighter aircraft.  A need to get fighter aircraft from an airbase 
or carrier to intercept hostile fighter jets was identified.  The Marine Air Control 
Squadron (MACS) was given that mission of controlling combat fighter jets and 
launching anti aircraft missiles to defend Marine assets.  
The Tactical Air Command Squadron (TACC) was designed as a facility from 
which information from the MACS and DASC, that is air to air intercepts and air to 
ground attacks, as well as helicopter sorties and cargo transports, could be passed up to 
be collected and evaluated during the day to day operations.  Additionally, the TACC was 
the facility from which air campaigns were planned and executed.  The tenet of 
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“centralized command, decentralized control” was followed – the TACC commanded, the 
MACS and DASC controlled. 
 
B. CURRENT AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
The MACCS equipment was developed and fielding in a ‘stove pipe’ fashion.  
Newer systems are being developed in an open architecture fashion.  This section will 
discuss the current systems employed by units of the MACCS and address new, emerging 
systems that are being planned for fielding in the next decade. 
1. Stovepipe Systems of the MACCS 
Since its inception, the MACCS has fielded, and currently uses, legacy systems 
that can be considered “stovepipe”.  These systems were designed with a singleness of 
purpose.  Due to the structure of the MACCS, there was a limited ability to share data 
and information amongst units within the MACCS.  The only way of sharing information 
was to verbally pass it from lower echelon (TAOC, DASC) units to higher echelon 
(TACC) units, or to pass rudimentary orders via Tactical Digital Information Links 
(TADIL).   
Due to this fact, systems were designed with no regard for reuse of technology.  
Although many of the functions of the TAOC are replicated at the TACC (in fact, the 
TAOC, in event of a catastrophic failure at the TACC, will serve as the Alternate TACC), 
two separate systems were developed.  The only data automatically shared between the 
TAOC and TACC were aircraft tracks passed in the form symbols via TADIL.  ATO or 
other reports were disseminated manually (in paper or verbal form), and updated by hand.  
No database sharing of information was available. 
These stovepipe systems were in use up to the Desert Shield/Desert Storm era.  
During the post DS/DS era, all units have either replaced their older stovepipe systems 
with newer ones, or made upgrades to these systems.  Most systems have become 
hybrids.  Although they still are designed with a single purpose in mind, some parts are 
being modified for the common sharing of information between units.  Since 1991, the 
following upgrades or replacements have taken place: 
• TAOC – replaced the AN/TYQ-2 and AN/TYQ-3A Tactical Air 
Operations Central (TAOC) with the AN/TYQ-23 Tactical Air Operations 
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Module (TAOM).  Improvements upon the TAOC with the TAOM 
allowed for ‘modularization’ of the system.  Each TAOM can function as 
an independent system, linking to sensors, as well as containing it is own 
single channel radio assets and cryptographic equipment. 
• TACC – replaced the AN/TYQ-1, Tactical Air Command Central with, 
first, the AN/TYQ-51 Advanced Tactical Air Command Central, and then 
a conglomerate of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) equipment and 
jointly used systems, housed in portable cases and shelters.  Equipment 
allows for ATO development and processing of airspace tracks via 
datalink, all displayed and processed on commercial Sun desktop 
computers. 
• DASC – replaced older DASC equipment with, first, the Improved DASC 
(IDASC), and then the current High Mobility Downsized (HMD) DASC.  
This allows the DASC to function within the MACCS out of High 
Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), outfitted with radios and 
computers. 
2. Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) 
In response to growing budget concerns and the ever-increasing need for 
interoperability among units of the MACCS, as well as a drive toward open source 
systems, other Marine C2 units, and joint C2 agencies, the desire for a common C2 
platform for all Marine Air Control Group units was proposed in the early 1990’s.  
Termed the Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), the objective of 
this system will be to leverage off of current, commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
technology to provide an open architecture system that allows for scalability, modularity, 
and interoperability.  The Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating 
Environment (DII COE) is the basic operation system that is used to ensure 
interoperability with other C2 systems.  The CAC2S Mission Needs Statement (MNS) 
was signed in April 1995, with an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) approved 
in November 1997.   
Specifically, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) defines 
CAC2S as follows:  
CAC2S provides a common hardware platform with a suite of common 
software that can be scaled and tailored to support mission planning and 
execution for any or all aviation command element operations.  CAC2S 
will be interoperable with joint, allied, and coalition forces and can 
operate in a variety of mobile (air, ground, ship) operational nodes tailored 
to meet aviation mission and planning functionalities. 
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CAC2S is designed to eliminate the stovepipe systems of the past.  Similar to the 
way computers in commercial industry look and feel the same (where an individual can 
sit down and perform any task he or she requires), the goal for CAC2S is to have a single 
computer for any individual.  Regardless of what mission you must perform, or what 
squadron you belong to, CAC2S will be a single system, with a common workstation and 
operating system.    
3. Joint Systems 
Other services have adopted the open architecture C2 system approach as well.  It 
is imperative that our systems are able to seamlessly interoperate with other services to 
accomplish any mission.  A system such as the Air Force’s Theater Battle Management 
Core Systems (TBMCS), which in essence is the Air Force version of CAC2S, is a good 
example.  TBMCS integrates a suite of C2 applications, and a full range of air mission 
functions, sensor data and intelligence gathering, and automates many elements that 
comprise the planning and execution phases for theater air operations.  TBMCS can 
generate detailed air tasking orders (ATO), almost three times the present level of 
information, providing more detail about targets and the mission, requiring one-third 
fewer planners and in half the time.  TBMCS is designed to replace all old, legacy Air 
Force C2 systems.  Although primarily built for the Air Force, it does have several joint 
segments that will be common to all DoD services.  Specifically, it was required to be 
used for the processing of the ATO by all services.  As such, our systems must 
interoperate with TBMCS on some level. 
The Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all have diverse missions and 
tasks such as how to build and tailor systems to meet the mission of an individual service, 
yet have the flexibility to interoperate, not just interact, with the systems of other 
services.  The seamless transfer of data, database information, and common air tracks – 
all present a problem for designers, users, and program managers alike.  Technology of 
the 21st century will rely on satellite communications, wireless computing, and smaller 
unit decision making more than ever. 
C. CURRENT AND EMERGING DOCTRINE 
The mission and objective of the Marine Corps – locate, close with, and destroy 
the enemy by fire and close combat – has remained relatively unchanged for 225 years.  
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However, in the decade since Desert Shield/Desert Storm, new missions and doctrines for 
the Marine Corps and other services have emerged.  These doctrines have developed in 
response to the ever-changing global landscape.  The major regional conflict scenario is 
being diminished and replaced by threats of terrorism, low scale nuclear conflicts, and 
humanitarian efforts.  As such, the Marine Corps and the DoD in general have adopted 
new doctrines on how to fight in the 21st century. 
1. JV2020 
As described in the document, Joint Vision 2020  
JV2020 builds upon and extends the conceptual template established by 
Joint Vision 2010 to guide the continuing transformation of America’s 
Armed Forces.  The overall goal of the transformation described in 
JV2020 is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum 
of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent 
in any form of conflict.  The joint force, because of its flexibility and 
responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future.  
The integration of core competencies provided by the individual Services 
is essential to the joint team, and the employment of the capabilities of the 
Total Force (active, reserve, guard, and civilian members) increases the 
options for the commander and complicates the choices of our opponents.  
To build the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: 
intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.  
The overarching focus of this vision is full spectrum dominance – 
achieved through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.  
Attaining that goal requires the steady infusion of new technology and 
modernization and replacement of equipment.  However, material 
superiority alone is not sufficient.  Of greater importance is the 
development of doctrine, organizations, training and education, leaders, 
and people that effectively take advantage of the technology. (JV2020, 
2000) 
What is of significance here is the “material superiority alone is not sufficient...of 
greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations…, and people that 
effectively take advantage of the technology”.  This lends itself to the point that will be 
made later – technology solutions are not always solutions.   
The joint force is the preeminent force of readiness in the 21st century.  Although 
the Marine Corps will be called on to perform missions as a self contained force in 
readiness, on most occasions it will be required to fight with sister services.  This 
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doctrine should be central to our organizational and technological makeup.  We must be 
able, and willing, to seamlessly fight with other services. 
 
2. OMFTS 
In the late 1990’s, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General C.C. Krulak, 
signed Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).  In his foreword, he writes: 
In the White Papers ... and Forward ...from the Sea, the Navy and Marine 
Corps presented a common vision for a future in which skillfully handled 
naval forces would enable the United States to exert its influence in the 
littoral regions on the world.  Building upon the foundation laid by those 
papers, deals explicitly with the full spectrum of challenges that we will 
have to face, the dangers and opportunities created by new technologies, 
and the very exciting prospect of adapting the tradition of maneuver 
warfare, not merely to amphibious operations, but to all aspects of warfare 
in and around, coastal waters. (OMFTS) 
The purpose of OMFTS is to present a document for the 21st century of Marine 
and Naval warfighting.  OMFTS uses maneuvers of naval forces at the operational level 
(three levels include: Strategic, Theater, Operational) to strike at the heart of the enemy’s 
center of gravity.  For this to work, a C2 system, integrated to combine all forces (air, 
land, sea) must be capable of rapid decision making.  As OMFTS points out, fundamental 
changes in the area of education and doctrine is the key to success, more so than in the 
area of hardware.  It also stresses that aviation (and, by default, aviation C2) must be 
employed as an integral part of the naval expeditionary force.  With the current MACG 
design structure, true expeditionary deployment is not possible.  The MACCS cannot 
function in the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) arena.  To be relevant to the MEU 
mission, the MACCS must be more flexible and lighter that the current encumbering state 
it is in. 
3. Marine Corps Strategy 21 
Marine Corps Strategy 21 is currently Commandant James Jones’ vision for how 
the Marine Corps will not only fight and win our nation’s battles, but develop Marines to 
be citizens of the country as well.  The vision of Strategy 21 capitalizes on innovation, 
experimentation, and technology.  At the same time, it puts a premium on jointness, naval 
force projection, and the ability to react to any situation, a total force in readiness.  It 
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supports JV2020, and notes that every MAGTF must be a scalable force.  This suggests 
that Air, Ground, C2 forces must be broken down into the smallest piece, that is, a MEU.  
As pointed out, the MACCS is not MEU capable. 
4. MCDP 6 – Command and Control 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Pub 6, Command and Control, lays out the Marine vision 
for all C2 for Marine operations.  As MCDP 6 points out “no single activity in war is 
more important than command and control”.  Chapter 3 of the publication speaks about 
Command and Control theories.  Specifically, organizational theory is laid out in the 
document.  Narrowing the span of control – deepening the layers of command and 
lessening the number of immediate subordinates – will result in slowing down the 
information moving up or down the chain of command.  MCDP 6 points this out in 
Chapter 6, but also notes that a flat organization can exist when the widened span of 
control can be controlled.  This is important to note.  As will be discussed in Chapter III 
of this document, organizational structures, at least in industry, are increasingly becoming 
‘flat’.  The notion of information moving slowly up the chain of command from lower 
‘units’ to upper tier decision makers is obsolete due to the proliferation of communication 
speed.  How the Marine Corps will react to such a change in thinking remains to be seen.  
Flat organizations empower decision making at the lowest level.  Yet, there is an inherent 
desire to maintain control at the top.  A fluid battlefield requires quick decision making at 
the center of gravity.  Deep organizational structures (like that of the MACCS) will be 
replaced by flatter organizations to maintain the speed required of fast tempo operations. 
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III. DRIVERS OF CHANGE FOR THE MACCS 
Carter McNamara, PhD, writes in Basic Context for Organizational Change 
(McNamara, 1999),  
The concept of organizational change is in regard to organization-wide 
change, as opposed to smaller changes such as adding a new person, 
modifying a program, etc.  Examples of organization-wide change might 
include a change in mission, restructuring operations, new 
technologies…Some experts refer to organizational transformation. Often 
this term designates a fundamental and radical reorientation in the way the 
organization operates. 
The Marine Corps, and the MACCS, is prime for reorganization.  As documented, 
new technologies, which allow for automatic transfer of information in a timely manner 
(as opposed to voice) and new doctrines which are being formulated to place emphasis on 
speed and timely decision making on smaller unit levels, are driving the way the MACCS 
is organizationally structured.  Dr. McNamara says that organization wide change might 
include changes in mission and technologies.  As the C2 triangle in Figure 2 shows, 
technology, doctrine and organization are intricately tied together.  Two cannot change 
without the third changing as well.  This is the main driver of change.  The MACCS 
structure cannot remain stagnant while the others continue to evolve. 
Additionally, Dr. McNamara writes,  
Change should not be done for the sake of change -- it is a strategy to 
accomplish some overall goal…usually organizational change is provoked 
by some major outside driving force…typically, organizations must 
undertake organization-wide change to evolve to a different level in their 
life cycle 
If the MACCS is to change, it must be done to achieve the goal of functioning 
more effectively and efficiently.  The consequence of not operating in a manner more 
fitting to the current missions of the MAGTF is obsolescence or irrelevance.  However 
improbable, budget constraints and personnel cutbacks could lead to looking to joint C2 




A. DESERT STORM TO PRESENT 
The MACCS was last used, operationally and as a whole, during Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm.  During the operation (which lasted from August 1990 to April 
1991), the MACCS functioned in a MEF level operation.  The MACCS contribution to 
the warfighting effort can be seen as both a success, and as an after action report from the 
Commanding Officer, VMFA-235, points out, a failure as well.   
The MACCS was successfully deployed to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War 
buildup.  The TACC worked with joint and coalition forces to conduct the air war, while 
the MACG subordinate units functioned within the MACCS structure.  This is the only 
example of the MACCS being deployed, outside of exercise scenarios, since the end of 
the Vietnam War.  It was not deployed during Bosnia, Kosovo, or any other recent crisis 
in which the Marines or U.S. military has been involved.  Although it was deployed and 
had involvement in the operation, it was not necessarily looked upon as being a ‘fluid’ 
system that was necessary to the success of the campaign. 
A Marine Corps Lesson Learned System (MCLLS) submission from the 
Commanding Officer of VMFA-235, submitted after the campaign notes, “The Marine 
Aviation Command and Control System (MACCS) stymied the effective and efficient 
use of aircraft due to the inherent and well known shortcomings…”.  By this statement, 
the assumption would be that the MACCS leaders take action to correct the deficiencies.  
First, it is written by a Marine aviation commanding officer involved in the war; second, 
it is precisely this arm of the MAGTF that the MACCS is designed to serve.  If the 
MACCS, in it is current form, could not serve the MAGTF during the largest buildup of 
U.S. forces in the past 25 years, to expect that it can function and serve the MAGTF now 
with the missions and threats facing the military in the 21st century would be 
shortsighted.  As noted by the same officer a decade ago “Now is the time to reevaluate 
our MACCS structure” (MCCLS, 1991).     
B. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 
Due to the rapid pace that technology matures (according to Gordon Moore, co 
founder of Intel, chip speed will double its capacity every 18 months), systems become 
obsolete much faster than in the past.  Although technology and computers have been 
central to the MACCS since inception, long lead times in the development of systems 
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cannot be accepted.  In an interview with a program officer at Marine Corps Systems 
Command, initial operating capability (IOC) for CAC2S will occur sometime in FY 06.  
This is far too long of a development cycle to expect that requirements developed 
presently would still be relevant at IOC.  With the proliferation of smaller enemy states 
that have capabilities to infiltrate military C2 networks, more care must be put into 
securing systems.  A system based on today’s technology will be four generations of 
computer power behind industry by fielding.  Marine Corps Systems Command has not 
yet factored in satellite communications, digital communication, ever-increasing 
bandwidth, and network centric systems with interoperability joint forces in the plan for 
either CAC2S or the MACCS reorganization.  Rapid development of a “70%” solution to 
fix technological shortfalls should replace long lead times to develop and field 
specifically tailored systems; that is, a 70% solution fielded now is better than developing 
what is considered a 100% solution, and deploying that system when it is obsolete. 
The Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) was tasked by the Marine 
Corps to evaluate its command and control systems interoperability late in the 1980’s.  In 
the report on the interoperability issues (NRAC, 2001), the panel noted: 
Major organizational changes in the Marine Corps are currently being 
implemented which have the potential for improving the management of 
intra/interoperability issues.  Other encouraging indications include the 
good progress being made in Marine aviation-specific systems, and the 
excellent cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps in addressing 
and resolving interoperability problems between the two Services. 
The panel noted that the goal of integrating systems (such as CAC2S) was a 
correct course of action for the Marine Corps.  The panel noted: 
The goal of an integrated tactical C2 system correctly anticipated needs of 
Marine Corps commanders for automated decision aids based on enhanced 
battlefield information pressing, display, and communication.  This need 
has become acute in recent times because of two trends, both of which are 
expected to continue in the foreseeable future.  First, advances in sensor 
systems are contributing to enormous increases in the volume of tactically 
significant information.  Second, increasing mobility of tactical forces is 
confronting commanders with shrinking decision times.  
Additionally, NRAC pointed out that: 
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Command and Control data communication requirements for all phases of 
MAGTF operations, including over-the-horizon assaults, should be re-
evaluated.  Interface and data-traffic load requirements should be 
analyzed.  All critical system design constraints (such as data 
security/integrity and system robustness) must be defined.  Architecture 
should be adopted which satisfies near term needs and can also support 
future growth. 
All of this points to the open architecture, evolutionary approach to systems 
design that allows for growth and expansion, vice revolutionary development, with long 
lead times in testing and fielding.  Building ‘open architecture’ systems, based upon 
COTS and emerging technology, appears to be the flagship course of action.  Careful 
adherence to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology 
(DUSD, S&T) Software Intensive Systems Directorate must be followed.  In the 
directorate, the Software Program Managers Network (SPMN) 16 Critical Software 
PracticesTM are spelled out (SPNM, 2001).  Ignoring documentation that derives from 
trends in technology leads to the creation of more stovepipe systems that could be 
obsolete before fielding.   
C. PROFESSIONAL PAPERS/INTERVIEWS 
In the August 2000 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette, Captain Matthew Sieber, 
in an essay titled Marine Air Control Group – Be Gone writes about dramatically altering 
the MACCS as it is known.  This article took 2nd place in the 1999 Chase Prize Essay 
Contest.  In the article (Sieber, 2000), Captain Sieber, an air command and control 
officer, suggests  
The rapid growth of technology will certainly drive us toward a Marine 
air-ground task force (MAGTF) network centric command and control 
(C2) system and away from specialized Marine air command and control 
system (MACCS) 
Additionally, he notes that  
The fundamental shift in paradigms from specialized and centralized C2 to 
a flatter, general, and decentralized C2 system allows us to observe, orient, 
decide, and act operationally at a faster tempo than ever before 
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This is precisely what is driving the need to reorganize.  However, the article 
tends to lead to the reshuffling of the nodes of the MACCS, vice truly reengineering 
organization and functionality.  Not unlike other articles on organizational change, there 
is a recommendation to shift things around, vice eliminate or function, differently.  The 
article talks about the “absorption of functions of the MACG”, and eliminating it.  This 
does not solve the bigger issue – fundamentally working differently.  In this scenario, the 
MACG dissolves and the functions of air support or air control go to other locations. 
In the May 2000 Marine Corps Gazette, Colonel James Thigpen, Commanding 
Officer of MACG-28, writes the summation article (Thigpen, 2000) to a series written 
about the MACCS and mentions  
Historically, it has been difficult to synchronize advances in equipment, 
organization, and doctrine simultaneously…but, a word of caution…we 
can go too far in “fixin’ what isn’t broke. 
While on the one hand, Colonel Thigpen writes of wanting to challenge the 
current structure to see if it still works, he counters with a view that the MACCS is 
flexible, scalable, and has more technically sophisticated Marines, and can function 
efficiently as is. 
This seems to be the widely held view amongst the officers (midrange Captains 
and Majors) interviewed.  While upper level commanders hold a belief that the MACCS 
is better today than in the past, the younger generation of officers see a strong need to 
change or eventually they can see the MACCS as being irrelevant to the MAGTF.   
During research in Washington D.C. in May of 2001, interviews with 
representatives at the Marine Corps Systems Command, Marine Corps Aviation 
Requirements Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, and contractors were conducted.  
Opinions were expressed on the MACCS based upon experiences and current roles.  
Opinions were varied. 
Currently, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Aviation Department (APC) is in the 
process of publishing a three part series of booklets on the MACCS.  The Marine Air 
Command and Control System and Operational Maneuver from the Sea (Part One: The 
Roadmap), and The Marine Air Command and Control System and Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare (Part Two: MACCS Employment Options) have already been 
published and released.  The assistant to the director of aviation command and control is 
drafting Part Three, Organization, which will deal with MACCS reorganization.  APC 
23 
takes note in Part Three that the MACCS has not changed, and attempts to lay out a 
framework for change.  Specifically, Part Three notes: 
Over the past four decades the Marine Air Control Group has not 
experienced major organizational changes.  Although some of the names, 
numbers and types of subordinate units have periodically changed, its 
basic structure has not.  Today’s MACG and MACCS reflect a dated 
organizational structure that it is now time to review and reconsider in 
light of the challenges it must face as it moves into the 21st century.  The 
MACCS must evolve from its current form to a new, significantly altered 
one that can better support the MAGTF within an ever changing and 
dynamic environment, especially on the non-linear, decentralized 
battlefields of the future. 
The document talks to a two-phased approach for change.  Phase I is near term 
and is referred to as a “Functional Model”.  Phase II is called a “Cross-Functional 
Model”.  The goal is for Phase one to be completed between 2006 and 2010.  Phase II is 
set to be implemented between 2012 and 2015.  Although organizational change cannot 
occur rapidly, a timeframe of that length would suggest that changes implemented now 
may be irrelevant in 15 years, even obsolete by that point.  As an example, APC views 
current radar systems still being in use in 2015, retaining the need to be a self contained 
C2 system (autonomous from fighting jointly), but have not accounted for satellite or 
digital communication technology that will be highly evolved by 2015.  Changing must 
take into account expanding technologies and make concessions for them. 
The flaw with this approach is that the plan for reorganization is set too far out, 
and that no accounting is made for massive improvement in technologies in the next 
decade.  APC sees that reorganization is vital, but the development of a plan to achieve it 
cannot be attained from within the organization.  APC is trying to reorganize itself, 
internally, which makes true reorganizing nearly impossible.   
A second interview was conducted with the Aviation C2 Requirements 
Coordinator at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) (White, 
2001).  The discussion revolved around a new mindset of ‘task organization’ for the 
MACG, and for the dissolvement of the TAOC and DASC functional breakdown.  The 
view of MCCDC appears to be that the emerging technology of CAC2S will push the 
MACCS away from command and control to command and coordination.  The word 
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control refers much more closely to observing and directing units, people, and aircraft.  In 
the past, control was needed due to the limitations in electronics, communications, and 
avionics.  Today, though, there is a move to coordination.  Coordinating is much more 
arbitrary, as it seeks to set in motion events and allow subordinates to work 
independently. 
As there is a move toward command and coordination, the need for traditional 
MACCS structure dissolves.  The Major noted, “making everyone get rid of their 
ricebowls will be near to impossible”.  The view of the Commanding Officer from 
VMFA-235 was also supported by questioning the relevance of the MACCS during the 
conflict, yet with concerning how, there seemed to be a strong opposition to 
acknowledging the shortcomings. 
A final interview was conducted with a contractor who had formerly worked for 
the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) (Hingle, 2001).  The 
company contracted was to create a model, using the Universal Modeling Language 
(UML), and to determine if CAC2S could facilitate the elimination or restructuring of 
billets within the MACCS.  Data networks replacing analog networks would allow for 
timely passing of information via automated channels, as opposed to the traditional 
means of voice or manual transmission. 
Funding for the contract was cut, and the contract disbanded at the beginning of 
FY2000.  There was a belief that some of the data derived from the modeling showed the 
that the Table of Organization (T/O) could be restructured, or even downsized, with 
CAC2S driving the new way the MACCS could function.  Commanders are very 
reluctant to ever give up personnel billets, even if they are not necessarily vital to the 
mission, simply because it becomes nearly impossible to retrieve those billets at a later 
date.  Perhaps a point of note would be that the Assistant Program Manager (APM) who 
hired the contractor was a CH-48 pilot, “outside” the organization and thereby less of a 
stakeholder in the MACCS.  Perspective on a need for restructuring would be different 





There would seem to be consequences to not restructuring the MACCS.  Among 
them is the possibility of obsolescence, forced downsizing, dissolvement, mission failure, 
and even a loss of trust within the Marine Corps aviation community.  Organizations that 
do not change over time can find themselves to be irrelevant to the mission 
accomplishment they are designed to accomplish.  If the MACCS were to either continue 
to function in the manner up to, and after, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, or to push 
reorganization off to the next decade, there is a risk of losing a ‘mission’ altogether to 
other forms of C2 (Navy E-2C, Air Force AWACS, or MAGTF C2 systems).  The 
MACCS has a definite place in aviation and MAGTF, but only when it supports the 
current mission of Marine Aviation. 
E. STREAMLINING THE MACG 
Reorganization of the MACCS is being addressed by the Aviation branch of 
Headquarters Marine Corps (code APC).  It was first noted in the pamphlet The Marine 
Air Command and Control System and Operational Maneuver from the Sea: Part One, 
The Roadmap.  Organization is talked about toward the end of the booklet.  The authors 
point out  
Technological trends will drive force structure toward flattened, more 
effective, and more flexible command organization, resulting in better 
overall coordination and reaction times.  These enhanced organizations 
will complement greater joint interoperability, reduced embarkation 
footprints, and open architecture systems based on common hardware and 
software.  Specialized air control unit organizations may evolve into cross-
functional commands capable of multifunctional command and 
coordination operations.   
The admission to the fact that technology will force a flattened organization is a 
key point to the quote.  Also, the authors use the term ‘command and coordination’.  
Nothing is mentioned on how to achieve this organizational change, however.  To say it 
has to be done is easy; to make it happen is very difficult. 
In an article for the Marine Corps Gazette of May 2000, Colonel James E. 
Thigpen, Commanding Officer, MACG-28, writes  
We must at least be willing to ask ourselves if we can organize differently 
to employ these weapon systems more effectively – to challenge the 
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current paradigm to see if it remains valid.  It may well be that we find 
that these new technologies and processes are limited by our unwillingness 
to consider a new order of things. 
He also writes  
…it doesn’t make much sense to employ new processes and technologies 
in the old order of things – if the processes and technologies are 
specifically designed to help us do things differently…historically, it has 
been difficult to synchronize advances in equipment, organization, and 
doctrine simultaneously.   
Those statements support the notion of having to change the MACCS 
organization to meet the changes in doctrine and technology.  Colonel Thigpen backs off 
a bit with noting … “a word of caution.  We can go too far in ‘fixin’ what isn’t broke”.   
There is now, and will continue to be, a cautious attitude toward reorganization.  
This is inherent in any organization that wishes to restructure itself.  People naturally 
resist change, especially in the military, where change can result in budget and personnel 
cuts. 
It is apparent from these quotes that organizational change is seen as a necessity.  
In The Marine Air Command and Control System and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare: 
Part Three, Organization (which at present time is still in draft form), reorganization is 
addressed.  In the overview, the authors of the document state   
Over the past four decades the Marine Air Control Group has not 
experienced major organizational change.  Although some of the names, 
numbers and types of subordinate units have periodically changed, its 
basic structure has not.  Today’s MACG and MACCS reflect a dated 
organizational structure that it is now time to review and reconsider in 
light of the challenges it must face as it moves into the 21st century.  The 
MACCS must evolve from its current form to a new, significantly altered 
one that can better support the MAGTF within an ever changing and 
dynamic environment, especially on the non-linear, decentralized 
battlefields of the future.   
The plan for reorganization is spelled out over a 15-year cycle, and makes no 
concessions for the rapid improvements in technology, such as satellites, the proliferation 
of networks and World Wide Web technology, or how wireless, digital communications 
will affect command and control.  The current plan, under APC, calls for a phased 
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approach to reorganization.  The models for this approach are shown in Figures 5 through 





















Figure 5. Current MACG Organization. [From: The Marine Air Command 
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Figure 6. Phase 1 Reorganization. [From: The Marine Air Command and 
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Figure 7. MACD Bn Organization under Phase 1. [From: The Marine Air 
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Figure 8. Phase 2 Reorganization. [From: The Marine Air Command and 
Control System and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Part Three: Organization] 
 
 
Several other statements in the publication stand out, as well.  Amongst them are: 
• ‘These unique organizations (the current structure) do not optimize the use 
of information technology’ – organizations should function efficiently 
outside of the realm of technology. 
• ‘Organizational theory provides for a number of design options that may 
increase the efficiency of the MACCS’ – there is no explanation of what 
that organizational theory is exactly.  APC will need to study the effects of 
organizational change, theories on changing, drivers of change, and 
models.  This is not a small task. 
• ‘In the next few years, 2004-2008, “MACCS Convergence” will 
occur…this will utilize improved information technologies and will allow 
the MACCS to transform its organization’ – the convergence is in two 
phases (as shown in the figures above), and reaches out to 2015.  If the 
MACCS is organizing based on today’s technology, then to assume that 
the reorganization will be relevant with 2015 technology is to ignore the 
fast pace of technology’s evolution. 
• Organic sensors, such as ground-based radars, are the only source of 
sensor data mentioned, with no consideration given to satellite based 
sensor capability that is expanding in scope amongst the other services.   
When the organizational models are studied, some models can lead to the 
reshuffling of the same pieces.  Although Battalions are formed, with Air Defense and 
Air Support, as well as Air Traffic Control (ATC), under them, these Battalions are 
essentially the same as the squadron formations that exist today.  Air Tasking Order 
(ATO) development and management are still the primary functions of the MACCS in 
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low intensity conflict missions.  In this, helicopter and transport aircraft, as well as a 
small amount of close air support aircraft, are the primary functions of Marine aviation.  
Yet, in the new organizational model, there still remains a single MTACS, or TACC, for 
each MACG.  Air defense, support, and traffic control will exist in each battalion, leaving 
one command element, the TACC, for all of them.  A structure that allows each battalion 
to function autonomously, from command down to control and coordination, is a more 
far-reaching goal, it would seem. 
The main point that must be brought out from reviewing APC’s document about 
changing the MACCS is that the model for change is being drafted within the 
organization.  True organizational change can only occur from outside the organization.  
Members of an organization cannot change themselves.  They must physically or 
mentally remove themselves from the organization in order to process this change.  In 
that manner, they no longer become stakeholders, and are no longer resistant to the 
pressures to keep the status quo. 
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IV. PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Victory will go to the highly imaginative and those least fettered by 
conventional notions of what an organization has to be.  - Tom Peters 
Based upon new, emerging technology that is going to be designed to provide for 
more network centric command and control (or coordination), as well and doctrine of 
warfighting based upon highly flexible, task-oriented maneuver, the MACCS is primed 
for reorganization of structure.  Within the MACCS field, it has been identified by 
support commands and individual fleet and staff officers that we must reorganize to 
remain viable to the aviation C2 mission.  This begs the question of how to reorganize.  
This chapter will explain that organizational change is a highly complex task that requires 
thought and acceptance.  No organization can reorganize itself in a vacuum.  
Stakeholders in any organization naturally resist even the basic tenets of reorganization.  
Members of any organization will draw upon how things “have always been done”, and 
either resist the change altogether, not accept the change, or simply look to do things the 
same way within the new organization.  Expert writings in the field of organizational 
change and behavior will show how the MACCS must approach the change. 
A. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY 
The open systems theory for setting forth organizational change by application of 
information technology is one that must be considered if the change is to be considered 
effective.  Dr. Yogesh Malhotra, PhD, drawing upon numerous sources, proposes several 
theories as to how IT can be used to drive the change of organizations.  As environments 
become more turbulent, organizations must adapt at the same rate to maintain its 
advantage.  Among his theories are that the turbulent environments (in this case, 
business, but can translate to the turbulent military conflict environment) drive 
organizations to use IT for empowering workers at all levels, increasing span of control, 
and increasing lateral communications. (Malhortha, 1993)    
A growing number of managers and professionals believe that information 
technologies can drive organizational change (Kling, 1998).  Computers and 
communication technologies are seen as a way to streamline operations, and facilitating 
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distributed decision-making authority.  However, understanding the organizational 
implications of adopting new technologies can be difficult for organizational planners.  
1. Productivity Paradox 
The ‘productivity paradox’ sheds light on the role of technology in defining how 
the MACCS can improve on the practices of command and control.  Studies have 
continually shown that technology is not a deciding factor in how productive either an 
organization, business, or people can be.  Technology, therefore, must solely be looked at 
as a tool that assists an individual in performing tasks, or a substitute for a task. 
A business example can highlight this issue.  In 1971, Citicorp faced a problem 
with changing the ways that they processed business transactions (Seeger, 1974).  The 
bank’s Operating Group was one of six organizationally functioning groups within the 
company.  As Citicorp grew in size, so did the Operating Group.  The volume of 
paperwork was ever increasing.  Functions included transferring money between 
domestic and foreign accounts, processing checks, print and mail statements, and handle 
incoming and outgoing calls and telegrams.  When new management took over, in the 
effort to streamline and improve these processes, a study was conducted and realignment 
was suggested.  One of the most important issues for the Operating Group to face was to 
what extent the problems faced could be fixed with technology.  And, although the 
computer facilities had grown, the basic process performed had remained the same.  They 
were basically doing the same work with new technology, vice making the technology 
work for them.  And, in the end, it was decided that a new computer system would be 
brought online and implemented, almost overnight, to fix the problem. 
However, productivity did not improve.  There was a resistance to the new 
technology.  The change was accompanied by fear.  Fear that if the workers did not 
accept the new technology, that high level management would fire the employees.  
Within a year, the computer system failed, and it directly affected customers.  There were 
indicators that it would fail during this time, but high-level management perceived that all 
was well, while those who used the system saw many flaws in the system. 
In the end, what it took to improve the Operating Group was a shift in HOW they 
did business and not what they did it with.  Additionally, the Operating Group 
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management did not predict user backlash.  As the Marine Corps continues to develop 
CAC2S, it must take into account how the technology will be viewed and accepted by 
end users, and whether that technology will truly improve productivity. 
2. Disintermediation 
Up until this point, Marine aviation C2 has been a vertical, highly structured 
system.  This “verticalness” has always been facilitated by the need to pass information 
either manually or via analog voice channels from lower to upper echelon decision 
makers.  A lack of readily available real time information has made it so that decision 
making is structured with command at the top, and control at the bottom, of the decision 
making chain.  This has promoted the requirement for many ‘middlemen’, namely 
enlisted recorders and radio operators, as well as mid grade commissioned, and staff non-
commissioned, officers.  These individuals are all part of the checks and balance system 
to ensure accurate data, information, and intelligence was passed from the lowest to the 
highest-level decision makers.   
A 1998 article in The Financial Times newspaper notes “the much wider 
availability of low-cost real time, or near-real time, information in particular has spurred 
the process of disintermediation - cutting out the middle man from a transaction.  In 
theory, at least, easy access to information shifts the balance of power towards the end 
user - if all information is only a mouse click away, people will gravitate towards low 
cost or best value, particularly for commodity items.”  The same holds true for Marine 
C2.  If the information that is available at the lowest echelon is identical to that at the 
highest echelon, in real time, then there becomes less of a need, or desire, to pass 
information up several chains to enable decision-making.  Commanders will want to 
either make decisions, or enable decision making, at the lowest level possible.  This 
facilitates flexibility, the lack of a need for the vertical decision making pyramid 
(replaced by a horizontal structure), and a quicker response based on timely information.   
Once the C2 structure is disintermediated, reintermediation, or the introduction of 
new players to the C2 chain, must be approached carefully.  There is a tendency in the 
military to avoid change altogether, and to resist the influx of new technology.  If we 
disintermediate via new technology, allowing for faster, timelier information availability, 
and thereby eliminating the need for human interaction in the C2 chain, we risk a huge 
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backlash to the disintermediation process.  The adage of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” 
applies to the military as much today as it always has.  Additionally, the mantra of 
“we’ve always done it this way” seems to permeate from top down.  More and more, 
military leaders accept technology because they have to, and then insert it into the same 
organizational structure used in the past, thereby negating its positive effects.  If the goal 
is to reintermediate, organizations possibly subject themselves to doing nothing more 
than inserting the same billets back into the decision chain, rather than looking to 
reintermediate new ways of doing ‘business’.   
Disintermediation is something that can become part of the MACCS cycle.  
Network centric warfare is a way to disintermediate, and network centric warfare is a 
high profile effort at present time.  Use of networks, wireless LANS, database 
technology, satellite communications have all led to (or will lead to) small unit/low 
echelon decision-making, and flattening the organization hierarchy.  This can be an 
enabler for the C2 field in the 21st century. 
3. The Squandered Computer 
Paul Strassmann was appointed in 1991 to the newly created position of Director 
of Defense Information, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, 
Control, Communications and Intelligence.  In a book written by him, The Squandered 
Computer (Strassman, 1997), he postulates that in the business world, computer 
expenditures are often not matched to the objectives of an organization.  He writes, in the 
introduction, that there is a “sobering up of organizations inebriated with unjustified 
helpings of IT”.  Additionally, Strassmann’s writings parallel the idea of the 
“productivity paradox”.  The paradox states that IT alone does not solve an organization’s 
problems, nor does it make an organization more productive.  While there has been a 
huge influx of IT in the past 30 years into all sectors of society (industry, education, 
military), there has been no tangible evidence to show that any of these sectors is more 
proficient than they were without IT.  And, even though the productivity paradox is 
defined in the commercial arena, it can apply to any organization.  Strassmann offers 




For 55% of U.S. firms the 
computer budget exceeds their 
economic value-added. 
The "computer paradox" has not 
been repealed, contrary to 
claims. There is no 
demonstrable relationship 
between computer spending and 
corporate profits. 
Despite a 67% growth in computer 
spending, overhead costs of U.S. 
firms grew faster than their growth 
in revenues or profits. 
The "right" level of spending for 
computers reflects the 
bureaucratic characteristics of a 
firm, not revenue or profits. 
The insistence of computer 
magazines and academics to 
relate computer spending to 
corporate revenues or 
government agency budgets is 
misleading and encourages 
overspending. 
Claims that computers increased 
worker productivity are deceptive. 
The rise in revenue per employee 
is a reflection of increased 
outsourcing, not gains attributable 
to computerization. 
There are no "best practices" 
prescriptions how to spend 
money on computerization. 31% 
of computer projects are 
canceled; 53% will over-run 
budget and schedules. 
The government's policy to shift 
regulatory compliance 
paperwork to corporations 
creates a computer workload 
that has no payoff. 
The most popular methods for 
justifying spending on computers 
propose unverifiable commitments. 
Computer magazines have the 
tendency to popularize examples 
of excellence in computer usage 
that disregard financial results. 
Outsourcing of computer 
services is most often another 
form of drastic downsizing. 
The practice of outsourcing of 
computer services will increase as 
the costs of modernization of 
information technologies become 
prohibitive. 
The inherent conflict of interest 
among parties to outsourcing 
contracts will give rise to 
independent technology 
assessment firms. 
The cyclical investment pattern 
for computers is as much a 
reflection of shifts in 
organizational power as the 
result of technological 
innovation.  
Each technology introduction cycle 
is characterized by increased 
spending and destruction of 
information assets. 
The era of exuberant business 
spending for computers is 
coming to an end. Economics 
will prevail over electronics. 
  
 
Strassmann’s research shows that increasing investment in more Information 
Technology is seen by business as a way to solve the ills and shortfalls of productivity in 
the work place.  This holds true for the government and military sector.  Investment in, 
and deployment of, newer, faster, and ‘better’ technology does not, and will not, ensure 
more efficient operational practices. 
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Strassmann, in his acknowledgements of other authors in his book, refers to Erik 
Brynjolfsson.  Brynjolfsson, writing for the Center for Coordination Science, MIT Sloan 
School of Management, writes that  
The overall negative correlation between economy-wide productivity and 
the advent of computers is behind many of the arguments that IT has not 
helped US productivity or even that IT investments have been counter-
productive. (Brynjolfsson, 1994) 
The human processes and organizational relationships define the efficiency of an 
organization.  Thus, the Marine Corps cannot expect to simply change IT hardware or 
software (i.e. the development and fielding of CAC2S), and expect improved warfighting 
ability.  The Marine Corps must place equal or greater emphasis on the “upgrading” of its 
organizational structure to ensure that new IT can be, and will be, accepted and used to its 
full potential.   
The foremost experts in the technology field agree to this one principle – 
increased investment on newer technology does not correlate to increased productivity 
(this is the ‘productivity paradox’).  It would seem, then, that the way to increase 
productivity must lie in the practices of an organization.  Therefore, to increase 
productivity, how business is conducted, not what it is conducted with, is the important 
step.  In the end, developing CAC2S and fielding it will not necessarily increase 
productivity by itself. 
B. PROPONENTS OF CHANGE 
If need for change is required, how is it attained?  There are processes and 
models, as well as theories, on how to do this.  An actual model for change will not be 
laid out in this chapter.  Figures 5-8 in the previous chapter show some models for 
change developed at APC.  What needs to be discussed and examined is how 
organizations successfully shift the paradigm of how they do business through thoughtful 
reconsideration of their organizational structures.  Organizational change is externally 
induced, and adaptability is a function of the ability of the organization to learn and 
perform according to the changing environmental contingencies.  
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1. Senge and Systems Thinking 
Peter Senge (1990) is the author of The Fifth Discipline and a foremost expert in 
the field of organizational theory.  His areas of special interest focus on decentralizing the 
role of leadership in organizations so as to enhance the capacity of all people to work 
productively toward common goals. Dr. Senge's work articulates a cornerstone position 
of human values in the workplace; namely, that vision, purpose, reflectiveness, and 
systems thinking are essential if organizations are to realize their potentials.  
In The Fifth Discipline, he describes the title subject as “systems thinking”.  That 
is, the integration of the disciplines of building shared vision, mental models, team 
learning, and personal mastery to realize the potential of individuals and organizations, 
fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice.  Most organizations that fail let 
evidence of trouble go unheeded, even when individual managers are aware of such 
trouble.  Although his book talks about industry, it can apply to any organization.  
Senge talks to what he terms as a ‘shift of mind’.  In this sense, he means to see 
not in parts but in wholes.  When systems thinking is applied, the organization and 
relationships are not seen lineally, but as a constant cause and effect, circular relationship.  
To describe this, he has created ‘loops’, that can show how as we try to change or 
implement an action, cause and effect can lead to the same problems.  An example is the 







Figure 9. Senge Loop.  [From: Senge, 1990] 
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In this archetype, there is a known problem.  As a fix is implemented, instead of 
an instant change or solution, there is always a delay.  A delay can lead to unintended 
consequences, and these consequences contribute to a problem again.  Systems thinking 
attempts to overcome this, and other archetype mistakes, by allowing individuals not to 
view linear cause and effect, but to see the bigger picture. 
2. Flat vs. Hierarchical Structure 
Organizations are traditionally structured in two fashions: horizontal and vertical 
(hierarchical). In this fashion, information flow, communication, and interaction among 
individuals are dynamically different.  Organizations that are horizontal (also termed flat, 
employee-empowered, shared services, flexible) have at their core a management 
philosophy that focuses on key organizational processes.  Just as corporations view 
globalization and new technology as key factors to reorganize, the Marine Corps must 
view ‘jointness’ and network centric warfare as factors to streamline the command and 
control processes.   
The hierarchy style worked very well up until the recent years when more flexible 
structures have been needed to adjust to the dynamics introduced by technology 
(Seelbach, 2000).  Communication, in multiple forms, is key to maintaining 
competitiveness.  Horizontal structures allow for communication to flow across, as well 
as, down.  With flat structures, fewer ‘managers’ are needed below the top level to allow 
communication to flow.  Mid level officers were needed in the communication and 
decision making process in the MACCS, where technology can make up for those 
individuals.  Total decentralization is not a requirement, nor is it desired.  The key is to 
provide lower level members of the organization the autonomy to make decisions, with 
upper level officers to focus on strategy and problem solving. 
According to Jay Galbraith, leaders of modern organizations are becoming 
increasingly involved in organization design.  Management is bringing more people into 
the decision-making processes of organizations, primarily through decentralization.  This 
is because change requires that organizations make more decisions more frequently, and 
thus to expand the decision-making capacity.  Speed requires that decisions be moved to 
points of direct contact with the work, to meet shorter lead times.  This is the classic issue 
of decentralization of decision-making, and the more modern concept of movement of 
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power to departments.  Information and decision processes cut across the organization's 
structure.  
Management processes are both vertical and horizontal.  Vertical Processes 
allocate the resources of funds and talent.  They are usually planning and budgeting 
processes.  The needs of different departments are centrally collected, and priorities are 
decided for the budgeting and allocation of the resources to capital, research and 
development, training, etc.  Horizontal Processes (also known as Lateral Processes) are 
designed around the workflow (e.g., new product development or customer order 
fulfillment).  These processes are becoming the primary vehicle for managing in today's 
organizations.  Lateral processes can be carried out in a range of ways, from voluntary 
contacts between employees to complex and formally chartered teams (Galbriath, 1995). 
Both structures have advantages.  However, horizontal structure facilitates 
communication flow, and communication is increased as key organizational processes are 
emphasized.  This is key to the decentralization of power.  Conversely, as horizontal 
structures tend to be more flexible and allow for decentralization, organization members 
often find it difficult to know to whom to report.  Dr. Michael Ryan hypothesizes that “a 
governmental organization with a flat organizational structure is an effective learner” 
(Ryan, 2000). 
Minztberg, in his model of shifting organizational configurations from centralized 
to decentralized, makes the point that the military has been moving to increased 
complexity for decades, and that it is continuing.  The military is now, and always has 
been in the case of war, moving toward the upper right (see Figure 10).  High complexity, 
high change requires more mutual adjustment (Galbraith’s lateral communications).  
Networks can enable that.  It thus increases the decision making and information 
processing capacity of the organization and prevents overload of commanders in the 
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Figure 10. Shift in Organizational Configuration for Modal DoD 
Organizations as they Move through the RMA. [From: Jansen, 2000] 
 
If the MACCS becomes more flat, care must be put into the development of 
processes that empower lower level members and define reporting responsibilities, as 
well as place focus on mission accomplishment at the lowest tiers.  
3. Change Technology 
David Gleicher has been attributed with the development of the formula depicted 
in Figure 11 (Rouda, 1995).    
 
=  Dissatisfaction   X   Vision   X   Process  >  Resistance 
 
Figure 11. Gleicher’s Change Formula. [From: Rouda, 1995] 
 
For change to occur, the product of dissatisfaction (analysis or feedback about the 
present state of an organization), vision (the future of the organization), and process 
(transition to the new organization) must be greater than the resistance (feeling of loss) to 
the change by members.  The formula is a product due to the fact that if any of the three 
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factors (dissatisfaction, vision, or process) is zero, thereby non-existent, then the formula 
fails.  Change can only happen if there is dissatisfaction about the current state of the 
organization, if there is vision to change, and there is a solid process to this change.  All 
of this must overcome the resistance to this reorganization.  Should members be 
unwilling to change in such manner that far exceeds the other factors, the change will be 
ignored, rejected, or fought against.  The goal is to bring approaches to the organization 
that will enable these three components to surface so that the process of change can begin 
(Rouda, 1995). 
C. BARRIERS TO CHANGE 
The realities of any organizational change dictate: 
• Periodic strategic change often necessary for survival  
• Change is a continuous process  
• Profound change takes times  
• Often produces massive resistance  
Because of this, changing tends to be resisted by humans on all levels, from 
personal to professional.  Few organizational change efforts tend to be complete failures, 
but few tend to be entirely successful, either. (Kotter, 1995) Here, resistance and 
overcoming will be discussed, with additional focus placed on models and involvement. 
1. Resistance  
Don Bryant (1979), in The Psychology of Resistance to Change, writes about 
factors that influence attitudes to change.  Changing, and overcoming the boundaries, is a 
psychological process as well as a physical process.  There is a resistance to any change 
due to the natural threats that humans face when confronting new ways of doing business.  
Several factors that determine how individuals feel about impending change include: 
• The basic predisposition to changing, based upon learned experiences 
from as early as birth, where learned norms affect how we do things 
• Personal security, where maintaining the status quo can provide a feeling 
of comfort 
• Current cultural beliefs that exist 
• Trust and loyalty that exist from past and present relationships 
• Apprehensiveness or expectations about particular change, and how it will 
affect the organization or job security 
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Reducing change can be addressed by considering who brings the change, what 
the change will be, and how to best effect the change.  Individuals in the organization 
need to have some sort of involvement in the change process.  Any change must be 
introduced with clearly stated goals that have support from the top.  The view of change 
must provide stakeholders the realization that it will reduce, vice increase, current 
workloads.  If the change involves participants who are allowed to participate from the 
beginning, allowing for feedback, with acceptance of both sides for the need to change by 
both lower and upper echelon personnel, with the option to revise and review at a later 
date, then resistance will be reduced (Bryant, 1979). 
Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) also offer their four basic reasons for the resistance 
to change.  All efforts to change an organization tend to encounter some form of human 
resistance, from passive to aggressive.  Their four most basic reasons people resist are: 
• Parochial self interest – resist when they think they will lose something of 
value as a result 
• Misunderstanding and lack of trust – the individuals do not understand the 
implications and perception is that the cost is greater than the gain of 
change 
• Different assessments – assess the situation differently from those 
initiating the change 
• Low tolerance for change – fear of inability to develop new skills or 
behavior required of them 
The authors offer these four reasons as a foundation to how to overcome the 
change, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Another important aspect of change is that change cannot be affected internally.  
Engineers of change must either be physically or emotionally removed from the change 
process.  Non-stakeholders do not feel loss brought by change.  Consultants or 
professionals who can implement and institute change must be brought into the mix of 
the change is to be successful. 
Paul Lawrence notes ‘what employees resist is usually not technical change but 
social change – the change in their human relationships that generally accompanies 
technical change’. (Lawrence, 1954)  This would apply to the idea that as the MACCS 
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brings CAC2S online, the system will not be resisted; the greater resistance would be to 
restructuring to use the system.   
Sources of resistance to change also include: 
• Inertia  
• Habit  
• Resource limitations  
• Threats to power and influence  
• Fear of the unknown  
• Social influence and social information processing  
There are, then, numerous reasons why people will resist change.  What can be 
determined is that if organizational change is to be implemented, it will not necessarily be 
an easy process.  Thought and understanding must be put into the process if the barriers 
are to be overcome and the change successful. 
2. Overcoming 
The idea of overcoming the barriers and leading the way to organizational change, 
especially with an IT organization (which the MACCS can be considered), has been 
proposed by numerous experts in the field.  IT-enabled organizational change is the 
explicit arrangement of information technology for the purpose of enabling changes in 
practices, processes, or structures or an organization.  It targets an organization’s 
processes, structures, management, culture, and competitive balance (Kling, 1998). 
Hammer and Champy, in 1993, focused on IT as an essential enabler for the 
reengineering of organizations.  Their five precepts are: 
• Radical Transformation – quantum leaps of change, vice incremental 
• Obliterate vice automate – change comes from clean slate concepts 
• Focus is process based – work processes decomposed into component 
tasks and activities, and then reengineered into work arrangements 
• Top down directed – sweeping authority change, downward through the 
organization 
• IT is a critical enabler – access to seamless information powers the 
efficiencies and coordinates interactions in the new organization 
Counter to the notion of participation, Larwrence leaves absent from the list 
participation by those involved.  Although it has become popular to think that 
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participation dealing with change resistance is a way to overcome resistance, it is not 
necessarily a good way for management to deal with the issue.  Care would have to be 
put into whether or not to involve members in the process, and those same members that 
resist.  Thoughtful management efforts are more important than member participation. 
Kotter and Schlesinger, who offered four reasons why people resist change, also 
offer six ways to overcome the resistance.  Managers (or the implementers of change) 
often underestimate the negative backlash that the change can incite.  In order to 
overcome the backlash, they offer these as ways to deal with it: 
• Education and communication – can involve one on one, group 
presentations, or memo/reports 
• Participation and involvement – involve the potential resistors to forestall 
• Facilitation and support – most helpful when fear and anxiety are the root 
of the resistance.  Support of individuals is key to this. 
• Negotiation and agreement – incentives to the resistors to change, as well 
as negotiating a ‘middle’ ground 
• Manipulation and co-option – selective use information and conscious 
structuring of events 
• Explicit and implicit coercion – used when the change must happen fast, 
but risks backlash by members over the ‘forced’ change 
3. Change Methods 
There are numerous methods to managing large organizational change.  Robert 
Rouda (1995) summarizes the most widely used methods in his paper “Background 
Theory for Large Scale Organizational Change Methods”.  Amongst them are: 
• the theory-base uses less action research and discrepancy theory, and 
focuses on application of systems theory (see Senge)  
• the data base source is no longer internal to the organization, but now 
involves both the organization and its environment (an open-systems 
approach)  
• the data base, which formerly had limited availability, is now widely 
shared throughout the organization  
• time: what was formerly a slow "waterfall" process is now a fast, quick 
response which results in immediate action taking place  
• learning moves from the individual or unit to the whole organization  
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• the responsibility and accountability moves from senior management to a 
mixture of senior management plus the whole system  
• the consultant role, formerly reserved for data collection and feedback, 
now also includes structures and facilities for data analysis and action 
planning  
• the change process moves from incremental change to fundamental, 
organization-wide change  
A widely accepted method, or model, of the change process in human systems is 
Kurt Lewin’s change theory of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing (Figure 12).  
Lewin’s theory states that ‘human change, whether at the individual or group level, was a 
profound psychological dynamic process that involved painful unlearning without loss of 
ego identity and difficult relearning as one cognitively attempted to restructure one's 
thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and attitudes’ (Schein, 1993). 
Unfreezing             Changing              Freezing 
Figure 12. Lewin’s Change Theory Model. [From: Schein, 1993] 
 
Unfreezing states that for change to occur, driving and restraining forces have to 
be altered under complex psychological factors.  Just adding a driving force toward 
change often produces an immediate counterforce to maintain the equilibrium.  This 
observation led to the important insight that equilibrium could more easily be moved if 
one could remove restraining forces since there were usually already driving forces in the 
system. 
To unfreeze the beliefs that individuals hold in the organization, individuals must 
have disconfirmation of the belief system of the organization.  Dissatisfaction or 
frustrations generate a way to disconfirm an individual’s expectations or hopes.  The 
disconfirmation must incite “survival anxiety”, or the feeling that change does not occur, 
and there will be a failure to meet needs, goals or ideals that have been set (“survival 
guilt”).  However, what typically causes the defensive reaction in individuals is a second 
kind of anxiety called “learning anxiety”.  Learning anxiety is the fundamental 
restraining force that can go in direct proportion to the amount of disconfirmation, 
leading to the maintenance of equilibrium by defensive avoidance of the disconfirming 
information.  Dealing with learning anxiety, then, is the key to producing change. 
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To begin the changing process in the model, it is important to create for the 
learner some degree of “psychological safety”, or the ability to balance the amount of 
threat produced by disconfirming data with enough psychological safety to allow the 
change target to accept the information, feel the survival anxiety, and become motivated 
to change.  Motivation is not enough, and a theory or model of change must also explain 
the actual learning and change mechanisms.  A process of “cognitive restructuring”, 
occurs, taking in new information that has one or more of the following impacts:  
• Semantic redefinition - learning that words can mean something different 
from what had been assumed  
• Cognitive broadening – learning that a given concept can be much more 
broadly interpreted than what had been assumed 
• New standards of judgment or evaluation - learning that the anchors used 
for judgment and comparison are not absolute, and with different anchors, 
the scale of judgment shifts 
When refreezing, the new behavior must be to some degree consistent with the 
rest of the behavior and personality of the learner.  If not, the new behavior will simply 
set off new rounds of disconfirmation that often lead to unlearning the very thing one has 
learned.  For relational refreezing to occur, it is best to train the entire group that holds 
the norms that support the old behavior. 
Summarily, Lewin's basic model of change leads to a whole range of insights and 
new concepts that enrich change theory and make change dynamics more understandable 
and manageable.  If Lewin was correct that one couldn’t understand an organization 
without trying to change it, it is not possible to make an adequate diagnosis without 
intervening.  Consultants can ease this transition.  The best information about the 
dynamics of the organization will be how the organization deals with the consultant, 
because his or her very presence is de facto an intervention.  (Shein, 1993) 
4. Involvement 
There are two basic different views in the involvement process.  That is, to 
involve or not involve the members who must, in the end, accept the change.  Bryant 
notes that if participants from all sections of the organization are involved, then resistance 
will be reduced.  Kotter and Schlesinger also feel that involving potential resistors can 
forestall problems.  A facilitator of change, namely an expert consultant in change theory, 
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can also lend to the involvement process.  In the end, all members must feel the desire 
and goal of changing the organization. 
D. APPLYING CHANGE TO THE MACCS 
Applying the change model to the MACCS is not necessarily an easy task.  For 
the change to be successful, there are factors that must be considered. 
1. Factors to Identify 
First, the facilitator of change must come from external sources.  Leadership must 
realize that members of the organization cannot possibly hope to change the structure of 
the MACCS from inside the organization.  Individuals who are trained in change theories 
and have expertise in organizational change would be needed.  These experts could 
mediate the change, and help the leadership avoid pitfalls that would lead to failed 
change.  The person must have no stake in the organization, look for no gain from the 
change, or have a no fear of loss from the change.   
Secondly, resistors must be identified.  Individuals most likely to pose the greatest 
resistance to the change would be those who have a longer time in the organizations 
(upper level officers and staff non commissioned officers), and who would harbor the 
feelings of losing more from the change.  Lower level officers and enlisted Marines, with 
less time invested in the organization, would be more receptive to change.  Therefore, 
those with ingrained views on how the organization works will need to be dealt with 
differently, with greater effort to convince them that change is necessary and will benefit 
the entire organization in the long run. 
Lastly, the change must be well designed, articulated, and implemented.  
Members of the MACCS must have a clear understanding as to why the structure is being 
changed, what the new structure is going to look like, and how the structure will put into 
place at each of their units. 
2. Transforming the MACCS Organizational Structure 
For the MACCS, eight steps to transforming the organizational structure could be 
used (Kotter, 1995).  The steps have been applied to the MACCS as follows: 
• Establish a sense of urgency – Senior level staff and operational officers 
and Staff non commissioned officers must be made aware of the need and 
consequences of failing to change the organizational structure of the 
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MACCS.  These consequences must be real, and must be accepted by 
members. 
• Forming a powerful guiding coalition – Senior leadership must not be the 
only involved parties in the coalition to drive the change process, nor 
should it be only members of the support community (i.e. Marine Corps 
Systems Command, Marine Aviation Requirements, Headquarters Marine 
Corps).  Members from all areas of the MACCS (junior enlisted and 
officers, Fleet Marine Force and support Marines, technicians and 
operations personnel) must have a voice in the change process.  This will 
ultimately lead to general acceptance of the change.   
• Create a vision – as noted, change cannot happen for change alone.  There 
must be a clear vision of why the MACCS is changing its organizational 
structure.  Establishing new organizational designs of the MACCS, testing 
them, modeling them in simulated situations could all help to show where 
the MACCS is going.  Developing a picture of the future will clarify the 
direction, and without it, the MACCS reorganization could dissolve into 
confusion and incompatible projects.  Drafting models of the MACCS, 
and having them tested by experts in reorganization, would provide 
tangible data that would allow members of the MACCS to see how it 
would operate in future conflicts. 
• Communicate the vision – the MACCS Operational Advisory Group 
(OAG) must accept whatever change the guiding coalition would produce.  
The coalition must articulate clearly how the new MACCS organization 
was formed, why it was formed that way, and be shown some proof that 
the organizational model will work.  The vision must be simple to 
understand, thorough in its dissemination to all MACCS members, and 
communicated as so that the vast majority of the MACCS (all members 
will never be sold on the “one best solution”) want to accept it. 
• Removal of obstacles – large obstacles that will prevent acceptance of the 
change need to be removed.  For instance, certain members might feel as 
if, by changing, promotion opportunities and command billets will be 
eliminated.  In this case, a large obstacle may be a Staff NCO, Major, or 
Lieutenant Colonel who has worked in the MACCS for a great deal of 
time, only to find that the positions of power are being pared down by the 
reorganization.  These individuals possess the ability to undermine the 
group, and block the change process.  These individuals must be dealt with 
carefully and individually. 
• Planning for and creating short term wins – the MACCS cannot be 
radically transformed in a short period of time.  In this sense, APC’s 
vision of a two phased approach to change is a good thought.  Marines in 
the MACCS must see tangible gains from the change.  Setting goals is 
necessary.  Quarterly or biannual meetings to show progress would be 
recommended.  When the goal is set too high, failure is more likely, and 
resistors to the change are more than likely to declare the change a failure.  
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Establishing a small-scale test model, one part of the new organization, 
and allowing it to function in an exercise, could possibly lead to goal 
achievement.  The model unit could develop pros and cons, and these 
could then be factored into the new MACCS model.  Radical change, 
without knowing consequences of failure or success, would be ill advised.   
• Consolidating improvements and producing further change - declaring 
victory too soon is something that should be avoided.  If the test model 
organization performs well, the coalition and OAG cannot look to this as 
proof that reorganization will work.  Credibility established by the success 
of the test model can be leveraged upon to develop the larger MACCS 
model. 
• Institutionalizing new approaches – there must be a conscious effort to 
demonstrate to the MACCS that the change can be successful, and will 
work once it becomes the normal way of doing things.  There is a long 
time before all will generally accept the change.  A generation of officers 
and enlisted Marines must pass, in most cases.  
3. Change Model for the MACCS 
Several models for change have been proposed for the MACCS.  APC versions 
























Figure 13. Avn C2 Organizational Model. [From: Trabun, 2000] 
 
This model was the result of a Marine Air Control Group Operational Advisory 
Group (MACG OAG) working committee effort in January 2000.  This seems to be a 
good starting point for a MACCS reorganization model. It is the result of a working 
“committee” of members from the MACCS.  This points to the fact that the idea of 
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reorganizing the MACCS was the effort of numerous members of the MACCS.  This is 
important to help overcome obstacles to resistance.  The members focused the 
reorganization to supporting core warfighting functions of the MACCS.  Also, the models 
(Figure 13 is the end state model) are phased.  This assists in identifying where possible 
failures in the restructure might occur.     
The committee left open that the models should be further analyzed to determine 
options, requirements, and actions in the future. 
The OAG working committee model and effort could be the starting point to 
reorganizing the MACCS.  It should be cautioned that it is only the ‘starting’ point, and 
that the models and hypotheses laid out in the previous parts of this thesis must also be 
followed to avoid a failure of the change. 
E. SUMMARY 
To change large organizations such as the MACCS is a complex task.  The 
implementers of change will face resistance and obstacles along the way.  Overcoming 
such resistance or obstacles can be an arduous task.  Leaders of organizations must have 
careful and deliberate plans when attempting to set into motion any model of change.  
Success can be improved if the leaders conduct a solid organizational analysis, with 
factors relevant to producing needed change, and select a strategy that is then closely 











The MACCS has for its existence remained relatively stable and unchanged in its 
organizational structure.  Technology and doctrine are rapidly evolving and changing, 
and in this context, organizations cannot remain stagnant.  Although the consensus exists 
among various individuals and units that the MACCS must change, the notion of how to 
change, as well as why to change, is less understood.  Organizations cannot change 
simply for the sake of doing something different.  Organizations have attempted to 
restructure themselves in the industrial and postindustrial age, especially in light of 
improved technology, and many have met with failure.  Unless careful thought is put into 
the process, failure can be an expected outcome.  Support commands such as 
Headquarters, Marine Corps; Marine Corps Systems Command, and Requirements 
Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, must all find a common vision 
as to what they want and expect the MACCS to accomplish.  To reshuffle the same 
pieces into a different form misses the point.  To do anything less than a near 
revolutionary change is to risk no longer remaining relevant to the mission of the 
MAGTF.  Technology affords members of an organization to complete tasks differently, 
more effectively, and more efficiently.  The organization must be capable of facilitating 
this new way of doing business.  However, to try and change without a radical shift in the 
mindset is to set the change up for failure.  Careful thought in the change process, with 
models and a solid plan, must be put into place if the organization that is changing is 
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